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Wheelage And The Haulage Trespass:
Compensating The Landowner For
The Injury Sustained Or The Benefit
Derived From The Unauthorized
Surface Use
INTRODUCTION
Property located in a coal mining area has the potential to
produce income from two distinct sources. The first is derived
from the mining and sale of coal found on the property itself;
the second from payment for the use of its surface to haul coal
mined from other property to a central processing area or a
public road. The origin of the practice of contracting for surface
use is unclear, but reference to such agreements can be found
in caselaw dating back to the mid-nineteenth century.' Although
known by various titles such as way-leave2 or haulage royalty,3
wheelage is the generic name given to payment for use of road-
ways.4 Today, as it was in England over a century ago,5 wheelage
is calculated at a fixed sum for each ton of coal. transported
over the property.
6
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has previously ac-
knowledged the use of wheelage agreements in mining areas
7
today the Court steadfastly refuses to permit recovery based on
customary wheelage rates for unauthorized road use under either
trespass8 or unjust enrichment.9 The purpose of this note is to
assess the court's position under the existing law. Because tres-
Martin v. Porter, 5 M. & W. 352 (1839).
2 Jegon v. Vivian, L.R. 6 Ch. 742 (1871).
Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 177 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Ark. 1944).
See, e.g., Middle States Coal Co. v. Hicks, 608 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980).
Martin, 5 M. & W. 352.
See, e.g., Middle States Coal Co., 608 S.W.2d at 56-57.
Kentucky Mountain Coal Co. v. Hacker, 412 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Ky. 1967).
Id. at 583; Middle States Coal Co., 608 S.W.2d at 57; Triple Elkhorn Mining
Co. v. Anderson, 646 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1983).
Triple Elkhorn, 646 S.W.2d at 725.
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pass and unjust enrichment are distinct legal theories, this note
is divided into two sections, related to each other only in the
sense that the theory discussed in each has been offered to
support a claim for wheelage as compensation for a haulage
trespass. The conclusion reached in the first section is that since
wheelage represents the only accurate measure of rental value
for this unique form of trespass, its use as a measure of damage
in trespass is not only permissible, but advisable. The second
section concludes that, because the tortfeasor has benefitted
from the trespass, the landowner should be able to recover,
under unjust enrichment, the value of that benefit, measured by
the wheelage the wrongdoer would have paid had he or she
lawfully contracted for the privilege of using the property.
I. WHEELAGE AND USE VALUE IN TRESPASS
The general rule is that "any unauthorized entry upon the
land of another is a trespass,"' 0 and every trespass "results in
some damage."" Under Kentucky law, however, not all trans-
portation of coal from other property is unauthorized and there-
fore a trespass. In the case of subterranean use, "[slo long as
there is any of the immediate mineral in place ... "' the
mineral owner or lessee can, absent contract restrictions, use
tunnels and passageways made in the extraction of the mineral
for transporting minerals taken from other mining operations. 1
3
The reason stated for this rule is that "[n]o right of the owner
of the surface is interfered with in the slightest degree."" On the
other hand, a right to use the surface for the transportation of
other coal will not be implied in a lease."' Thus, any surface use
for such haulage without the express consent of the owner will
constitute a trespass.6
On the issue of damages for trespass, the standard used in
Kentucky distinguishes between compensation for permanent and
Hughett v. Caldwell County, 230 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1950).
'Id.
Middleton v. Harlan-Wallins Coal Corp., 66 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Ky. 1933).
Id.
I /d.
Moore v. Lackey Mining Co., 284 S.W. 415, 417 (Ky. 1926).
Marlowe v. Marcum, 171 S.W.2d 997, 998 (Ky. 1943); see Carmichael v. Old
Straight Creek Coal Corp., 22 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Ky. 1929).
WHEELAGE AND HAULAGE TRESPASS
temporary injuries. 7 When the injury is permanent, the recovery
is the difference in the fair market value before and after the
trespass.'8 On the other hand, when the injury is temporary, in
that it can be abated at any time with no lasting adverse effect
on the property, the measure of damages is "[tlhe depreciation
in rental value of the land during the period of occupancy if it
is rented out, but if occupied by the owner it is the diminution
in the value of the use of the property."' 9 This latter standard
is the correct measure of damages for a haulage trespass since
the resulting injury is limited to an unauthorized use which can
end at any time. Although this standard has been used for over
fifty years,20 Kentucky's highest court has vacillated on the issue
of whether wheelage falls within the criterion.
On two occasions prior to 1967, the then Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed the use of wheelage rates as the measure of
damages for unauthorized surface use. The first was Cary-Glen-
don Coal Co. v. Carmichael,2 where the Court approved dam-
ages based on a wheelage rate of one and one-half cent per ton
for 462,265 tons of coal mined on adjacent land and transported
over the plaintiff's property. 22 Then, in Buchanan Coal Co. v.
Mainis,23 where the lease at issue specifically permitted the
defendant to haul coal taken from adjacent land across the
surface of the leased premises, 24 the court affirmed a trial court
award of two cents per ton for the use of "the Napier Tract in
the transporting of coal purchased and taken from other lands
not ajoining or adjacent to the Napier Tract. ' 25
In 1967, in Kentucky Mountain Coal Co. v. Hacker,26 the
court held that although Cary-Glendon27 set out the proper
measure of damages, it was overruled to the extent that it used
,7 See Price Bros. v. City of Dawson Springs, 227 S.W. 470, 472 (Ky. 1921).
See id.
" Cary-Glendon Coal Co. v. Carmichael, 80 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Ky. 1935), rev'd, 412
S.W.2d 581 (1967) (on other grounds).
2o Price Bros., 227 S.W. 470.
2 80 S.W.2d 29, rev'd, 412 S.W.2d 581 (1967).
2- Id. at 31.
2" 245 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1952).
Id. at 924; Brief for Appellant at 18, Buchanan Coal, 245 S.W.2d 921.
2' Buchanan, 245 S.W.2d at 921.
412 S.W.2d at 581.
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wheelage as the basis for recovery. 28 The trial court in Hacker
had awarded two cents per ton for 181,297 tons of coal shown
to have been hauled over the plaintiff's property. 29 In setting
this award aside, the opinion simply stated that "[ajlthough two
cents per ton may have been customary by private contract, this
is not the established measure of damages for this character of
injury to real property." 30 Later cases have reiterated the posi-
tion in Hacker that wheelage is not the proper measure of
damage for trespass; however, no further explanation for the
exclusion has been given in these opinions.3'
A. The Diminution in Use Value
The keys to assessing the validity of excluding wheelage lie
in determining how the court has defined the bifurcated standard
used for temporary damages and what damages have been
awarded under it. Despite the lack of any apparent meaning for
the phrase "diminution in the value of use" or any indication
of how it might differ from rental value, no judicial definition
can be found in the haulage trespass caselaw.32 Other decisions,
however, do offer insight into the meaning of the term, which
forms the basis for recovery in all trespass actions. Foremost
among these cases is Adams Construction Co. v. Bentley,33 a
1960 decision in which the former Kentucky Court of Appeals
candidly conceded, "[p]rior decisions of this court furnish little
or no clue as to how the 'value of use' of property is to be
measured.1 3 4 The court then rectified this prior omission by
making reference to decisions of other jurisdictions, concluding
that use value is also generally measured by rental value.35 While
admitting that "the origin of the distinction [between property
1, 80 S.W.2d at 29, rev'd, 412 S.W.2d 581 (1967).
:' Hacker, 412 S.W.2d at 583.
I /d. at 582.
I d.
See Middle Slates Coal Co., 608 S.W.2d at 57; Triple Elkhorn, 646 S.W.2d at
726.
For example, Texaco v. Melton, 463 S.W.2d 301, 307 (Ky. 1971), implied that
the terms were defined differently, but made no effort to actually define them.
335 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1960).
Id. at 914.
Id.
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which is rented out and that which is not] is obscure," '3 6 the
court went on to state that use value can be broader than rental
value in that use value may permit recovery of the cost of renting
equivalent property when the subject property, on which the
trespass was committed, has no rental value.37 Holding that
"there must be introduced in evidence some tangible figure from
which the value of the use reasonably can be deduced," 38 the
court ordered a new trial on the issue of damages because no
evidence was offered as to "rental value of the dwelling in
question or as to the rental value of other comparable prop-
erty."3 9
Additional light is shed on the meaning of the diminution in
use standard by Wheeler v. Tackett.40 In that case, the plaintiff
had procured a court ordered easement by necessity over the
defendant's property, but for sixteen months thereafter, while
appealing the order, the defendant obstructed the plaintiff's use
of the passageway.42 In a subsequent action for trespass, in
applying the "diminution in use" standard, the jury awarded
damages in excess of what testimony set as the difference in
rental value of the plaintiff's property with and without the
easement.4 2 On appeal, the court stated that "the 'value of the
use' of property, as the concept is understood in this jurisdiction,
is not susceptible of precise measurement, but rental value is a
highly relevant factor." 43 Although the court then noted that the
jury award was greater than the diminution in rental value, it
concluded that the difference was not so great as to be excessive,
reasoning that "the great hardship" imposed by the trespass,
which here consisted of the plaintiff having to walk to the nearest
public road, rather than ride to it, could properly add to the




" Adams Consir. Co., 335 S.W.2d at 914-15.
- 339 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1960).
' Id. at 648.
Id. at 649 (Evidence introduced at the trial established that the rental value of
the property with the easement was $200 to $400 and 0 to $100 without it. The jury
awarded $600.).
' Id.
" Id.; see also Byerly Motors v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 346 S.W.2d 762 (Ky.
1961) (awarding rental value for trespass).
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B. Rental Value and Wheelage
The thrust of these cases is that rental value is the general
basis for calculating the measure of temporary damages in tres-
pass, regardless of the actual rental status of the property.
Consequently, the issue becomes whether wheelage falls within
the meaning of rental value. Although no Kentucky case was
found on point, other jurisdictions have given rental value the
ordinary meaning of the value of rent that would be paid for
the property. 4 Rent has been defined as "consideration paid for
the use of land."4 Because wheelage is a form of consideration
paid for the use of land, it is difficult to hypothesize why the
Kentucky Supreme Court will not consider wheelage in deter-
mining rental or use value. Two possible theories can be ad-
vanced: first, although it is a form of rent, wheelage is
inappropriate as a measure of damages in trespass; or second,
wheelage simply may not be rent.
1. Wheelage as a Measure of Damages for Trespass
The issue here is whether damages for trespass should be
measured by wheelage, which is based on the tonnage of coal
carried across the land. Is the connection too tenuous? Would
wheelage use allow the landowner to recover the trespasser's
profits rather than the use value of the property? These potential
problems emanate from basing the recovery on the specific acts
of the trespasser. The two cases which dealt with whether rent
or rental value should be measured in this manner reached
conflicting conclusions. However, comparison of these cases will
reconcile the holdings and provide the answer to the questions
presented.
In Pritchard Petroleum Co. v. Farmers Co-op Oil & Supply
Co. ,47 the Montana Supreme Court held that evidence as to the
amount of gas and other products sold by the defendant tres-
passer was inadmissible in determining rental value for the prop-
erty.48 In Pritchard, the trespass was committed on property
" Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Corp., 146 P.2d 256, 259 (Cal. 1944).
" Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 172 S.W. 932 (Ky. 1915).
" 190 P.2d 55 (Mont. 1947).
11 Id. at 59.
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developed by the plaintiff as a filling station, which ceased to
be used as such in 1934. 4 9 The defendant, Farmer's Co-op Oil,
occupied the land under a quitclaim deed in 1935, and again
used it as a filling station.5 0 In the subsequent suit for use and
occupation, the plaintiff sought one cent for each gallon of gas,
oil and grease which the defendant sold during its unlawful use
of the premises." In rejecting the plaintiff's theory, the court
stated that rental value "implied a fixed trespasser's amount,"
which should not be varied according to the trespasser's business
diligence or success.
52
This factual situation contrasts sharply with the facts in
DeCamp v. Bullard,53 where the Court of Appeals of New York
sustained a jury award of damages for use based on tollage, the
customary compensation paid for moving logs down a river.
5 4
In DeCamp, the plaintiff had obtained a restraining order to
stop the defendant from using a river on the plaintiff's property
to transport logs from an upstream timber cutting operation.
However, the trial court suspended the order so as to permit the
defendant to use the river to move timber previously cut, on the
condition that the defendant company would pay five thousand
dollars to the court to cover any damages. 5 In a later trial to
determine those damages, the jury was instructed to give the
plaintiff compensation for the use of the river.56 The jury was
permitted to hear testimony that use of the river was worth two
cents per mile per 1000 feet of logs. 7 The defendant appealed
both the instruction and award of five hundred dollars for the
use of the river.
5
1
After expressing doubt as to the trial court's authority to
sanction the trespass, even with indemnification, the court af-
firmed both the instruction and the award. 9 The court reasoned




54 N.E. 26 (N.Y. 1899).





DeCamp, 54 N.E. at 27.
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that the order required the defendant to indemnify any and all
damages, and held that in the case of deliberate trespass, dam-
ages included "damages in the nature of compensation for the
value of the use . . . " or "[wihatever the plaintiff might have
received from ... renting of the property.'"'6 The court then
held that the customary tollage rate was the proper measure of
rental value in this case.
6'
In comparing the two cases, one fundamental difference
becomes apparent. In Pritchard, the defendant had continuously
occupied a city lot that had a readily ascertainable fixed rental
value, which became evident when the trial court excluded tes-
timony as to the number of gallons of gas sold. This prompted
the president of the plaintiff corporation to place rental value
at one hundred dollars per month.62 Undoubtedly, if the land
had been used as a residence, the plaintiff would have originally
sought the one hundred dollars per month as compensation for
its use. That it prayed for damages based on the products sold
by the defendant under the guise of rental value is evidence of
the plantiff's effort to procure a percentage of the defendant's
profits. Any reference to profits in measuring damage for tres-
pass is impermissible.63 The focus is always on the loss sustained
by the plaintiff.64 Thus the court in Pritchard properly refused
to consider the defendant's profits in calculating rental value.
Although the Montana Court reached the right result in
Pritchard, its statement that rent implies a fixed amount is
troubling. 65 Even if rent is nearly always set at a certain amount
due periodically, use of a road in a mining area and use of a
river to float logs are two prime examples of property use for
which compensation is not customarily set at a fixed monthly
or weekly rate.6 Given this, in DeCamp, the plaintiff sought
and was awarded tollage, the customary compensation he would
have received for use of the river under any private contract.
67
I d. at 28.
I' d.
Pritchard, 190 P.2d at 59.
' Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co., 2 Ch. 538, 542 (1896).
Id.
Pritchard, 190 P.2d at 59.
" See DeCamp, 54 N.E. at 27; Hacker, 412 S.W.2d at 582.
DeCamp, 54 N.E. at 28.
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Thus, at least as to the method used for calculating use value,
the plaintiff in DeCamp did no better or worse in court than he
would have done in any private negotiations. In other words, he
did not procure any impermissible profit from the award.
A more subtle, but equally important, difference can also
distinguish the cases. In Pritchard, the injury sustained by the
trespass was unrelated to the business transactions of the tres-
passer, because its occupation of the land continued without
regard to the precise number of gallons of gas it sold. 68 On the
other hand, the scope of the intrusion on the landowner in
DeCamp was directly related to the number of logs the defendant
floated down the plaintiff's river. 69 The same is true in an action
for unauthorized haulage. Each time the land is entered and the
surface is used constitutes a distinct trespass, 70 and dependant
upon the maximum number of tons of coal each truck can haul,
tonnage does bear a relationship to the extent of the injury
caused by the trespass. Thus, given the unique character of the
haulage trespass, the use of wheelage to measure damages re-
sulting therefrom is proper because it does reflect both the extent
of the use of the land and the customary rate paid for such
use.71
2. Wheelage as a Collateral Contract
The second possible objection to the use of wheelage as a
measure of damages for a haulage trespass is that it is not rent,
and thus, not a proper basis for the award. In light of the
definition of rent as compensation for use, this seems to be an
even more tenuous argument. Nevertheless, dicta found in Ed-
wards v. Lee's Adm 'r72 does allude to a distinction in contracts
regarding land. The relevant passage states that "rental value
ordinarily indicates the amount of profit realized directly from
the land as land, aside from all collateral contracts." 73 Unfor-
tunately, after setting forth this proposition, the former Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals made no effort to distinguish the two
- Pritchard. 190 P.2d at 57.
- DeCamp, 54 N.E. at 28.
' Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1030 (Ky. 1936).
Saulsberry, 172 S.W. at 932.
72 96 S.W.2d at 1028.
71 Id. at 1031.
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terms, but did seem to include wheelage in the former category."
In its discussion of wheelage cases, in both England and pre-
Hacker"5 Kentucky (which permitted recovery of wheelage), the
court stated that rental value was being used by both to measure
the "profits" derived by the trespasser directly from the use of
the land itself.
76
Accepting arguendo that a wheelage agreement is a "collat-
eral contract" rather than a rental agreement, if the focus is
shifted to the purpose of the award, rather than the means
typically used to measure it, wheelage still forms the basis of
the recovery. According to Byerly Motors v. Phillips Petro-
leum, 7 7 trespass damages are "essentially [to compensate] for
deprivation of the use and enjoyment of the premises." '78 In light
of this purpose, wheelage is the proper measure of damages
because it parallels the precise deprivation for which the land-
owner is being compensated.7 9
Other jurisdictions, focusing on compensation rather than
the label given such payment, have used wheelage as a measure
of damages. The best example of this is found in the English
way-leave cases.80 The way-leave cases are based on the propo-
sition that "if one person has without leave of another been
using the other's land for his own purposes, he ought to pay
for such user."' s The name is derived from the court's reliance
on the customary rate paid for such use in determining the
damages. Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke
Co.8 2 is typical of these cases. There, the defendants had hauled
refuse from their colliery or coal mine onto the plaintiff's land
for a period of eight years. Although admitting the trespass, the
74 Id.
I d. at 1030 (citing to Carmichael v. Old Straight Coal Corp., 22 S.W.2d 572
(Ky. 1929)).
Id. at 1030-31.
346 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1961).
Id. at 765.
" See WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS 443 (1913). "[E]verytime [the
trespasser] used the road, whether such use interlfere[d] with the [landowner's] active
employment of it or not, he temporarily deprive[d the [landowner] of his 'exclusive
use' ... " Id.
" See, e.g., Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 177 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Ark.
"I Whitwham, 2 Ch. at 541-42.
12 Id. at 538.
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defendants contended that the plaintiff's recovery should be
limited to damage to the property, which was substantial, be-
cause the practice had left the land "valueless" except for tipping
purposes."3
In affirming a lower court's holding that the defendants must
pay for both using and permanently injuring the property, the
court emphasized that the award was consistent with the rule
that "any benefit which accrues to the defendant is not an
element" to be considered in a trespass action.8 4 In summarizing
both the theory behind the award of damages and the use of
the customary amount paid per ton in measuring it, Lord Justice
Rigley stated:
The principle is that a trespasser shall not be allowed to make
use of another person's land without in some way compensat-
ing that other person for that user. Where the trespass consists
in using a way over the plaintiff's land a convenient way of
assessing damages may be by an inquiry as to way-leave,
which, when there is a customary rate of charge for way-leave
in the locality, may furnish a convenient measure of dam-
ages .... 5
This common sense approach to the problem, which recog-
nized the absence of other practical alternative means to measure
use value for this peculiar trespass, is remarkable for it candor.
The Arkansas Supreme Court found it persuasive as well, and
in Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves8 6 followed the English
precedent by calculating damages for unlawful haulage based on
the customary price paid under a private contract. 87 In its dis-
cussion of the issue, the Arkansas court cited both Corpus Juris
(which stated the proper measure of damages for continuing
trespass as "the worth of the use of the property" 8 ) and the
English cases (discussed supra), and concluded that " 'way-leave'
is the expression used in England, and 'haulage royalty' is the
expression used in Arkansas, but both expressions mean the
"' Id. at 538-39.
"I /d. at 542.
" Id. at 543.
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same." 8 9 The court then affirmed both the method of calculating
damages based on the haulage royalty (wheelage), and the rate
the Chancellor applied, which was one and one-half cents per
ton. 90
C. Discussion
While a Kentucky landowner whose property has been used
for unauthorized haulage can maintain an action in trespass, 9'
his concomitant right to recover for deprivation of use and
enjoyment caused by such a trespass is purely illusory. This
stems from the Catch-22 position in which existing law places
the landowner: he must offer evidence of use value in order to
receive commensurate compensation, 92 but the most relevant use
value available-wheelage-is not recognized by the Kentucky
Supreme Court as a measure of damages. 93
Although previously cited caselaw demonstrates that other
jurisdictions determine damages based on wheelage, 94 the focus
of this note has been on Kentucky law. The primary question
posed is whether excluding evidence on wheelage is valid under
the existing standard for recovery in trespass. 95 The conclusion
reached is that it is not, because Adams Construction, Wheeler,
and Byerly Motors demonstrate that rental value forms the
general basis of recovery for temporary damages in trespass,
regardless of the rental status of the property. 96 Consequently,
the only valid reason for excluding this information is because
it does not accurately measure the compensation which would
be paid for the use of the particular property. Clearly this would
not bar evidence of wheelage rates, since, as Kentucky's highest
court has repeatedly acknowledged, those rates are the customary
method used to fix compensation for use of private roadways
for haulage purposes.97 Thus they do offer an accurate estimate
of the use value of the property.
I d.
~'Id.
Marlowe v. Marcum, 171 S.W.2d 997, 999 (Ky. 1943).
-Adams Construction Co., 335 S.W.2d at 914.
See Hacker, 412 S.W.2d at 582-83; Middle States Coal Co., 608 S.W.2d at 57;
Triple Elkhorn, 646 S.W.2d at 726.
See supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
7 See Hacker, 412 S.W.2d at 582-83; Middle States Coal Co., 608 S.W.2d at 57.
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The preceding argument is based on the assumption that
Kentucky will equate wheelage with rent. However, if faced with
that precise issue, the Kentucky Supreme Court might determine,
as the Montana Supreme Court has,98 that wheelage is not rent
because rent implies a fixed amount of compensation." This
result seems unlikely given the opinion of Saulsberry v. Sauls-
berry."00 There, faced with interpreting a will provision giving
an individual a percentage of rent, Kentucky's highest court
concluded that rent could be defined to include royalty payments
for coal being mined on the property. 0 Because royalty pay-
ments and wheelage are both set at a fixed amount per ton, the
variable nature of the compensation due under a wheelage agree-
ment should not prevent its characterization as rent.
Should it distinguish Saulsberry, however, the court could
still use wheelage as the measure of damage for a haulage
trespass, because the purpose of the award of temporary dam-
ages is to compensate for deprivation of use and enjoyment.'
0 2
Since wheelage is the customary payment a landowner is willing
to accept for a voluntary deprivation of his exclusive right to
use his or her property, it is the proper basis for determining
the award. If the court should determine that wheelage is not
technically rent, it could rely on Adams Construction'03 and
Wheeler, °4 which indicate that "value of use" is a fluid concept'05
that can be broader than just rental value.2°6 To do otherwise
would exalt form over substance.
Aside from fairly compensating the victim, using wheelage
as the measure of damages would serve another important func-
tion. Since it is the customary rate of compensation, the effect
of the court's refusal to require the trespasser to pay wheelage
would place "a premium on trespassing, because it makes the
position of the trespasser more favorable than that of one law-
" See Pritchard, 190 P.2d at 55.
Id. at 59.
172 S.W. at 932.
Id. at 933.
See Byerly Motors, 346 S.W.2d at 765.
335 S.W.2d at 912.
" 339 S.W.2d at 646-49.
Id. at 649. ("[tihe 'value of the use' of property, as the concept is understood
in this jurisdiction, is not susceptible of precise measurement .....
"' Id. (citing Adams Construction, 335 S.W.2d at 914).
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fully contracting."'' 0 7 From a solely institutional perspective,
then, the rule should be changed, because legal sanctions should
operate to deter non-compliance with the law, rather than pro-
mote it. The right of the landowner to recover "fair value"'
0 8
for the use of his land can be realized and the integrity of the
legal system can be bolstered if the Kentucky Supreme Court
once again' °9 would recognize wheelage as the basis for calculat-
ing the measure of damages for the trespass resulting from the
transportation of coal or other minerals.
II. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Unjust enrichment, also called assumpsit,"0 quasi-contract,
restitution and contract implied at law, represents a second
theory upon which a landowner may recover wheelage for the
unauthorized use of his or her roadways. The cause of action
was first generalized in 1760 in the English case of Moses v.
Macferlan,"'' where Lord Mansfield stated: "[i]f the defendant
be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice to refund;
the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded in the
equity of the plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract, (quasi
ex contracta, as the Roman Law expresses it)."
'"1 2
Subsequent decisions have become more precise on the issue
of when to permit recovery based on unjust enrichment. Specif-
ically, in the case of a trespass, it has been stated that when one
commits a wrong or tort, "with the intention of benefitting his
own estate, the law will . . . imply or presume a contract on the
DeCamp, 54 N.E. at 28.
The phrase quoted is from a jury instruction found in Texaco, 463 S.W.2d at
309. The entire instruction reads:
If you believe from the evidence that the defendant unreasonably interfered
with plaintiffs' use of the surface of their land temporarily you will award
plaintiffs such sum as you believe from the evidence will compensate
plaintiffs for the fair value of the loss of use thereof for the period or
periods of such interference.
ld.
See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
Assumpsit is the term used in English law for an implied contract based on
unjust enrichment. See generally Moses v. Macferlan, 97 ENG. REP. 676 (K.B. 1760).
Id.
"1 Id. at 678.
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part of the wrongdoer to pay the party injured the full value of
all benefits resulting to such wrongdoer."" ' 3
Thus, in an action for unjust enrichment, recovery is based
on the benefit accruing to the wrongdoer, rather than the injury
suffered by the landowner. Obviously, there must be a benefit
to the tortfeasor. When there is injury but no benefit, as for
instance where cattle inadvertantly enter a neighbor's land dam-
aging growing crops, no action for unjust enrichment will lie.""
However, once a court determines that the wrongdoer has re-
ceived a benefit "under such circumstances that in equity and
in good conscience he [should] not retain it,""' the obligation
to compensate for the benefit arises from the operation of law
"without regard to the assent of the parties.""' 6 Indeed, the
obligation will be implied where a party lacks capacity to as-
sent," 7 or more typically, where the tortfeasor has specifically
intended to procure the benefit without entering into a con-
tract. "
A. Wheelage as Compensation for the Benefit Derived from
Trespass
Applying these general principles to the unauthorized use of
private roadways, unjust enrichment would seem to be available
to the landowner, for the trespasser has received the benefit of
having been able to move the coal without having to pay the
usual contract fee for such a privilege. The second element would
also be met because it would be unequitable or unfair to permit
retention of the benefit procured by committing a trespass."19
Further, Kentucky has precedent embodying these principles,
which, if followed, would permit recovery of wheelage in an
"I Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Atchison, 23 P. 610 (Kan. 1890) (citing Fanson v.
Linsley, 20 Kan. 235).
'" Roberts v. Moss, 106 S.W. 297, 299 (Ky. 1907) (an example presented in dicta).
Kellum v. Browning's Adm'r, 21 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Ky. 1929).
11 Id.
Rhodes v. Rhodes, 44 Ch.D. 94, 105 (1890).
Cablevision of Breckenridge v. Tannhauser Condominium Ass'n, 649 P.2d 1093
(Col. 1982) (awarding the plaintiff-cable company the usual subscription cost of cable
service from a condominium association which successfully intercepted the cable signals
without paying for them).
" See id.
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action based on unjust enrichment. The case, Edwards v. Lee's
Adm'r120 involved somewhat unusual circumstances. The defend-
ant there had conducted tours, without the plaintiff's permission,
through a cave which was partially located under the plaintiff's
property.' 2' Although the only entrance to the cave was located
on the defendant's land, the former Kentucky Court of Appeals
noted that "a wrongdoer shall not be permitted to make a profit
from his own wrong." The court awarded the plaintiff a share
of the net profits derived from showing the cave equal in amount
to the proportion of the cave underlying his property.
22
Although factually different, the trespass in Edwards is anal-
ogous to a haulage trespass, for in both instances the landowners
have a right to the exclusive use and enjoyment of their property.
Also, both trespassers have benefitted from their use of the land,
in violation of that right. Yet despite these similarities, in Triple
Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Anderson 23 the Kentucky Supreme Court
refused to allow evidence of wheelage rates under what it de-
scribed as the Edwards' exception.' 24 In support of this decision,
which dissolved a lower court order compelling discovery of
wheelage rates that the defendant mining company had paid in
the past, the court noted that the opinion in Edwards had been
declared "sui generis and peculiar on its facts, setting out that
reasonable rental value was impossible to compute under the
facts of that case.'
' 25
It is possible to read the opinion in Triple Elkhorn to mean
that unjust enrichment is unavailable when damages for trespass
can be assessed. This seems unlikely, however, since Kentucky
has long recognized the right to waive a tort action and sue on
an implied contract or unjust enrichment when the facts will
sustain such a cause of action. 26 The more plausible interpre-
tation is that the court will not rely on Edwards to extend unjust
enrichment to other forms of trespass.
The second explanation is preferrable to the first since it
does not absolutely foreclose recovery under unjust enrichment
96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936).
12' Id. at 1028-29.
2 d. at 1032.
'-1 646 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1983).
'12 Id. at 726.
-5 Id.
12, Roberts, 106 S.W. at 299.
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for a haulage trespass. However, it does significantly complicate
the task by creating several obstacles to achieving that recovery.
Simply put, Edwards was a landmark decision because it was in
contravention of two common law limitations on unjust enrich-
ment as a cause of action. The flurry of notations which ap-
peared in law journals discussing the "Great Cave Case" amply
demonstrates this point. 2 7 Without Edwards these limitations
must again be dealt with because both are implicated in a haulage
trespass. The first limitation is the nature of the benefit recover-
able under unjust enrichment. According to English decisions,
the benefit must represent a tangible increase to the tortfeasor's
estate and not just a savings thereof. 2 8 The second limitation,
dating back to the reign of George II, is that a landlord-tenant
relationship must exist for an action in assumpsit for rent to
lie. 2 9 Because of these two rules, a majority of jurisdictions
today do not permit recovery based on unjust enrichment for
the tortious use of land. 30 Of the two reasons, contemporary
courts have more readily rejected the former, which is surprising
since the latter emanates from purely historical reasons which
have no current relevance.' 3 ' But close scrutiny of each reveals
that neither can form an adequate basis for the rejection of
unjust enrichment in the case of the unauthorized use of land.
B. Nature of the Benefit
The leading English case rejecting recovery based on as-
sumpsit or unjust enrichment for unauthorized haulage is Phil-
lips v. Homfray.32 The case was actually before the court on
two separate occasions. First, in 1871, the court determined that
the plaintiff landowner was entitled to way-leave as damages for
the trespass committed by the defendants through their unau-
" Recent Cases, 31 II1. L. Rev. 661, 680 (1937); Recent Cases, 2 Mo. L. REV. 92,
115 (1937); Recent Decisions, 37 COL. L. REV. 477, 503 (1937); Recent Decisions, 35
MICH. L. REV. 1164, 1190 (1937).
,' See, e.g., Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439, 463 (1883).
See generally Ames, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation, 2 HARV. L. REV. 377
(1889).
.. See I Palmer, The Law of Restitution 74-75 (1978); Woodward, The Law of
Quasi Contracts 456 (1913).
.. See Woodard, supra note 118, at 456.
"2 24 Ch. D. at 439.
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thorized use of roads and underground passages to haul coal
from adjoining property.'33 After the action was commenced,
but before final judgement was entered, one of the tortfeasors
died. 34 Thus the issue on the second appeal was whether the
cause of action survived the tortfeasor's death.'35
Over a century earlier, in the case of Hambly v. Trott,
3 6
Lord Mansfield had set forth the general rule establishing when
a tort action survived a tortfeasor's death:
So far as the tort itself goes, an executor shall not be liable,
and therefore it is, that all public and all private crimes die
with the offender, and the executor is not chargeable; but so
far as the act of the offender is beneficial, his assets ought to
be answerable; and his executor shall be charged.'"
In Homfray, a majority of the court interpreted the benefit
for which assumpsit would lie, and thus survive the death of the
wrongdoer, as limited to "the proceeds or value of actual prop-
erty acquired wrongfully by the testator .... ,138 Thus "the mere
fact that the wrongful act or neglect saved the testator from
expense is not sufficient justification for suing his executor."' 39
In light of the narrow reading of benefit, the unauthorized use
of the property, which merely saved the tortfeasor in Homfray
from paying the usual way-leave charge, was held to be action-
able under trespass but not under an implied contract.1' ° As the
majority concluded, the deceased defendant had taken nothing
from the plaintiff nor had his own assets "been necessarily
swollen" by his carrying coal over the plaintiff's road. 4' "He
Phillips v. Homfray, 6 L.R.-Ch. 770 (1871).
Homfray, 24 Ch. D. at 441 states:
It is of the essence of the rule that claims which are indeterminate in their
character shall not be pursued against the estate of a person after his death.
If the claim is one for unliquidated damages, and has not been perfected
by judgment at the time of the death of the defendant the rule applies. ...
Id. at 466.
Id. at 466.
98 Eng. Rep. 1136 (K.B. 1776).
,,7 Id. at 1139.
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saved his estate expense, but he did not bring into it any addi-
tional property or value belonging to another person."'1
4 2
In a spirited dissent, Lord Justice Baggalay challenged the
majority's interpretation of Hambly v. Trott on three major
points. First, as to the necessity of the plaintiff's loss, he stated
that "a gain or acquisition to the wrongdoer by the work and
labour of another does not necessarily, if it does at all, imply a
diminution of the property of such other person."" 3 Secondly,
addressing the distinction between adding to an estate and merely
saving from its depletion, he said:
Speaking with much diffidence .. .I feel bound to say that I
can not appreciate the reasons upon which it is insisted that
although executors are bound to account for any accretions to
the property of the testator derived directly from his wrongful
act, they are not liable for the amount or value of any other
benefit which may be derived by his estate from or by reason
of such wrongful act.'"
Finally, the dissent stated the proper rule should be that a
court of equity ought to permit recovery based on an implied
contract, even after the death of the wrongdoer, "if the wrongful
act has resulted in any benefit capable of being measured pe-
cuniarily." 1
45
Considering the response of modern courts and commentar-
ies to the assertions made in the dissent, it can be stated with
certainty that Lord Justice Baggalay is not alone in his disap-
proval of the distinction made by the majority and the artifical
restriction it places on the meaning of a benefit. Evidence of a
broader view can be found in the Restatement of Restitution,
which states: "[A person] confers a benefit not only where he
adds to the property of another but also where he saves the
other from expense or loss. The word 'benefit' therefore denotes
any form of advantage."'46
Several cases, citing the Restatement with approval, have
permitted recovery based on unjust enrichment for an amount
I' Id. at 462-63.
' Id. at 471.
Homfray, 24 Ch. D. at 476.
" Id.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I comment b (1937).
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saved by a tortfeaser through his or her wrongdoing. Foremost
among these is Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 47 which after
describing the dissent in Homfray as "irrestible, ' ' 48 allowed
recovery of customary wheelage rates for unlawful haulage, on
the theory of assumpsit for use and occupation. 49 The decision
is noteworthy on two points. The damages claimed by the plain-
tiff were limited to the " 'exlusion of use' "10 for the periods
when the coal was being illegally hauled over his property. The
sole benefit accruing to the tortfeaser was the retention of com-
pensation it would have paid for the privilege had it lawfully
contracted with the landowner. In permitting the recovery, the
Virginia Supreme Court reasoned "[a]s the gist of the action is
to prevent the unjust enrichment of a wrongdoer from the illegal
use of another's property, such wrongdoer should be held on an
implied promise [for both direct and indirect benefits].''""
Other cases which define a savings as a benefit include
Phillips Petroleum v. Cowden.' 2 In that case the defendant oil
company had used certain property without the owner's permis-
sion to conduct seismographic tests intended to determine the
existence of oil on the land.'53 In the subsequent action for
unjust enrichment, the Court of Appeals, applying Texas law,
awarded the plaintiff the usual contract fee paid for the privilege
of mineral exploration. 5 4 A final example can be found in
Cablevision of Breckenridge v. Tannhauser Condominium
Ass'n,'" where a defendant who successfully intercepted cable
signals from the plaintiff-company was held liable for the usual
subscription price for the cable service.'
56
Thus, even without Edwards,' 7 precedent exists, which logic
would favor, for holding a savings resulting from the commis-
sion of a tort to be a sufficient benefit to support an action in
147 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946).
" " Id. at 237.
'49 Id.
1" Id. at 233 (the court quotes from the plaintiff's brief).
15 Id. at 237.
15- 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957).
" Id. at 592.
Id. at 593.
649 P.2d at 1093.
Id. at 1094.
Edwards, 96 S.W.2d at 1028.
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unjust enrichment, so long as the benefit can be measured pe-
cuniarily."' Although in only a footnote, Raven Red Ash ex-
plicitly states that the right exercised by a tortfeasor "must be
capable of being dealt with contractually" in order to ascertain
a "value upon which a contract might be founded."' 5 9 The cases
cited here demonstrate that courts seem to implicitly follow the
dissent in Homfray on this point.160
The third issue raised by Homfray is the necessity of a loss
to the plaintiff-landowner. Keener, a recognized scholar and
author of a treatise on the law of quasi-contracts, 6 took the
position that to recover it must "appear that what has been
added to the defendant's estate has been taken from the plain-
tiff's. That is to say, the facts must show, not only a plus but
a minus quality."1 62 Although not universally required,' 63 judicial
expression of this element can be found in older cases. Typical
of these cases is Qiwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,'6 where the
defendant, after expressly agreeing not to use an egg washing
machine owned by the plaintiff, took the machine out of storage
and used it for four years. In assessing the plaintiff's claim for
the benefit derived from the tortious use of the machine, the
Supreme Court of Washington stated it is "necessary to show
that while the [defendant] benefited from the use of the egg
washing machine, [the plaintiff] thereby incurred a loss.
' '
165
The decisions recognizing the need for a loss, however, have
also followed the dissent in Homfray by finding that there is no
requirement that a plaintiff's loss must equal a defendant's
gain. 16 This can also be seen in 01well, where the defendant
asserted that the plaintiff had suffered no loss because the ma-
chine was supposed to be in storage during the time it was used.
To support this contention it was shown that the defendant had
used the machine three years before the plaintiff accidently
See supra notes 143-56.
Raven Red Ash, 39 S.E.2d at 238, n.2.
Homfray, 24 Ch. D. at 476.
' KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1893).
'I Id. at 163; see also WOODWARD, supra note 130, at § 274.
Cablevision, 649 P.2d at 1096-97 (listing the elements of an action based on
unjust enrichment, which does not include a loss to the plaintiff).
' 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946).
'I Id. at 653.
" Homfray, 24 Ch. D. at 471-72.
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learned of his actions. 67 In rejecting the defendant's argument,
the court noted:
The very essence of the nature of property is the right to its
exclusive use. Without it no beneficial right remains. However
plausible, the [defendant] cannot be heard to say that his
wrongful invasion of the [plaintiff's] property right to exclusive
use is not a loss compensable in law.'
68
The benefit derived from the unauthorized use of the road-
ways can be valued at customary wheelage rates. If Kentucky
defines a benefit, as the Restatement of Restitution does, to
include any form of advantage procured by the trespass, one
obstacle to permitting the recovery of wheelage under unjust
enrichment can be removed. In the event that Kentucky follows
the older caselaw by requiring evidence of a loss to the plaintiff
as well, this should not warrant a different result, since that
burden can be sustained by showing the loss of the exclusive
right to use the property during the commission of the tort.
There remains the problem of the absence of a landlord-tenant
relationship between the landowner and the trespasser.
C. The Landlord-Tenant Requirement
To understand the reason behind this requirement, it is nec-
essary to take a brief excursion into English history, since there
is no contemporary basis for the rule. Noting that unjust en-
richment at least initially developed as a matter of common law,
and thus was extended on a case by case basis, 169 the explanation
begins with Wager of Law, a method of trial under early English
law in an action for debt. 70 By Wager of Law the one sought
to be charged asserted under oath that he did not owe the debt,
and when the party could produce eleven others who testified
that his oath was true, this acted as a defense to the action.' 7'
QOwell, 173 P.2d at 653-54.
Id. at 654; see also Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 205 A.2d 744 (N.J. 1964)
("We do not understand the trial court's use of 'trespass' . . . to limit the plaintiff to
an injury to the freehold, thereby excluding compensation for some benefit the defendant
may have garnered by a wrongful act unattended by depreciation of the value of the
strip.").
-' KEENER, supra note 161, at 1-12.
7, Ames, supra note 129.
,7, WOODWARD, supra note 130, at § 2.
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Needless to say, merchants disliked the practice, and the courts
responded relatively early by extending assumpsit for debt or
Indebitatus Assumpsit for the price of goods when no debt could
actually be shown.172 Since Wager of Law was not permitted in
an action to recover rent, the court did not act as quickly to
extend assumpsit to rent.'73
The landlord still had difficulties, however, in collecting his
rent. For instance, if a landlord sued in quantum meruit and
evidence showed a demise for a sum certain, this resulted in a
nonsuit.' 74 Also, if the landlord sued for a sum certain he had
to prove an express promise to pay the sum at the time of the
demise. 75 Parliament responded to this by passing Statute H
George H C.19 Sec. 14,176 which gave the landlord "the right to
sue in Assumpsit as well as in Debt without proof of an inde-
pendent express promise.' '1 77 According to Ames, since this In-
debitatus Assumpsit was statutory, the English Courts "could
not without too palpable a usurpation, extend the count to cases
not within the Act of Parliament."'' 7  Thus because the court
had not recognized assumpsit for rent absent a landlord-tenant
relationship prior to passage of the act and because it was
reluctant to do so afterwards, the rule that developed and is still
enforced today in most jurisdictions is that assumpsit for rent
will not lie without a landlord-tenant relationship.
79
One writer, upon reviewing the basis for the exclusion, has
commented that "[ilt is a reproach to the administration of
justice that many courts have adhered to tradition for no better
reason than this."' 80 A number of states, including Virginia and
several Western states, have specifically rejected it and now per-
mit an action in unjust enrichment for rent against a tres-
passer."' A few others have given damage in trespass a broad
AMES, supra note 129.
I ld. at 377.
174 Id.
"' Id. at 378.
,71 Id. at 379.
" Id. at 380.
,7' AMES, supra note 129, at 380.
179 Id.
'" PALMER, supra note 130, at 76 (hypothesizing that the rule has remained because
courts have failed to consider its origins).
'"I Cowden, 241 F.2d at 592 (applying Texas law); Raven Red Ash, 39 S.E.2d at
233; Atchison, 23 P. at 611. Kentucky is not among these states if Edwards is excluded.
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enough reading to include the benefit derived by the trespasser
and not just the injury suffered by the landowner.'82 Many more
states have stretched the landlord-tenant relationship to cover
the tenant at sufferance."3
Why the landlord-tenant requirement remains at all is a
mystery. Mandating a landlord-tenant relationship requires the
defendant to be on the property with the landowner's permission
in order for the owner to recover rent on an implied contract.'84
Thus if an entry is tortious at its inception, i.e. a trespass, the
owner is incapable of recovering rent from the tortfeasor. 185 In
England (as previously discussed), the landowner was still able
to recover rent, including way-leave, under trespass. 8 6 This might
explain the judicial reluctance to extend assumpsit beyond the
statute, since, although assumpsit and trespass are not co-exten-
sive, the landowner was still given some relief. In Kentucky,
however, the effect, at least as to a haulage trespass, is to
preclude the landowner from any recovery of customary whee-
lage which he or she would have received if the trespasser had
legally contracted for the right to use the roads. Because the
trespasser had undeniably benefitted through his or her tortious
act, to bar recovery in unjust enrichment because of an anti-
quated defense and the political maneuvering between the King's
Bench and Parliament in Eighteenth Century England is, as
Palmer opined, a reproach to justice.187 If the Kentucky Supreme
Court were to consider the basis for the exclusion and its result,
surely the rule would not stand.
D. Discussion
Although Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r'8 8 was a startling depar-
ture from the established law when it was announced in 1936,
Indeed prior to Edwards, case law specifically required the landlord tenant relationship
to recover rent on an implied contract. See Turnpike Road Co. v. Rogers, 70 Ky. (VII
Bush) 532 (1870).
2 See Marder, 205 A.2d at 745 (stating that recovery of a benefit derived from a
trespass is permissible in an action for trespass).
See City of Detroit v. Gleason, 74 N.W. 880 (Mich. 1889).
Raven Red Ash, 39 S.E.2d at 235.
Id. at 235-36; see also AMES, supra note 129, at 380.
See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
*7 PALMER, supra note 130, at 76.
- 96 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1936).
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many jurisdictions, either directly or indirectly, have come to
embrace the principles found in the decision. In light of the
arbitrary nature and effect of the English decision, the move
towards Edwards' more equitable and logical interpretation of
unjust enrichment is not surprising. What is inexplicable is the
Kentucky Supreme Court's refusal to apply the holding in Ed-
wards to other unauthorized use of property. The irony of the
situation can be best understood when it is realized that in Raven
Red Ash'8 9 the Virginia Supreme Court relied on the reasoning
in Edwards to support its decision to permit the recovery of
wheelage in an action based on unjust enrichment.'19
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Triple Elkhorn'91 is
the basis of the court's decision not to extend unjust enrichment
to a haulage trespass, which was because rental value can be
ascertained for surface use, when it could not be for the use of
a cave. 92 This implies that extending unjust enrichment is un-
necessary because the landowner has an adequate remedy in
trespass. As the review of trespass cases in the preceeding section
clearly established, although rental value (wheelage) is ascertain-
able for a haulage trespass, it is not the measure of damages
currently used for trespass.' 93 Thus Triple Elkhorn not only
signals a total fetreat from the promise of Edwards to afford
the landowner recovery of the benefit conferred on the trespasser
by his unauthorized use of land, but also represents an exercise
in judicial sophistry as well.
The only consolation found in Triple Elkhorn is that the
court did not use the case to specifically overrule Edwards, but
merely limited it to its facts. 94 So long as Edwards retains any
vitality, hope exists that the court will reconsider the issue and
determine that equity demands that Edwards and not Triple
Elkhorn define the availablility of unjust enrichment for a real
property trespass. Perhaps an awareness of the movement in
other jurisdictions towards a more liberal construction of the
- Raven Red Ash, 39 S.E.2d at 231.
- Id. at 237-38.
- Triple Elkhorn, 646 S.W.2d at 725.
'I ld. at 726.
See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
' Triple Elkhorn, 646 S.W.2d at 726.
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requisite benefit 95 and a frank appraisal of the reasons behind
the landlord-tenant requirement'9 will facilitate the return to
Edwards.
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky Supreme Court has two avenues available for
permitting the recovery of wheelage for a haulage trespass, with
legal precedent to support each. Since trespass and unjust en-
richment do not provide equal recovery under all circumstan-
ces, 97 the optimal solution would be for the court to recognize
both and allow the landowner to choose which action to bring.
Though somewhat unrealistic, the suggestion is not without merit,
because the election is currently available for a trespass which
has resulted in the removal of timber.19R If the court will not
recognize both, whether founded in the equity of the plaintiff's
claim that the defendant has been unjustly enriched by his or
her unauthorized use of the property or in the law of trespass,
the court should award wheelage to the landowner whose legal
right to exclusive use of his or her property has been violated
by a haulage trespass.
SHERRY KEITH
See supra notes 137-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
"' For instance, in some jurisdictions (with some indication that Kentucky is among
them), damages in trespass cannot exceed the value of the property involved. See OIwell,
173 P.2d at 654; Middle States Coal Co., 608 S.W.2d at 57 (stating an award in trespass
in excess of the value of the property was "excessive and clearly erroneous"). Thus in
the case of an extended trespass, suit on an implied contract would offer a more adequate
remedy, since its measure of damages is limited only by the benefit received by the
wrongdoer. On the other hand, when the actions of a trespasser would warrant the
imposition of punitive damages, they could be recovered under the trespass, but not
under an implied contract. Fordson Coal Co. v. Ky. River Coal Corp., 69 F.2d 131 (6th
Cir. 1934) (applying Kentucky law).
- Fordson Coal, 69 F.2d at 132; Roberts v. Moss, 106 S.W. 297, 299 (Ky. 1907).
